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Samuel Ruhmkorff’s article, The Incompatibility Problem and Religious 
Pluralism (2013), surveys the solutions proposed by various Religion Pluralist 
thinkers to the “incompatibility problem” often raised against Religious 
Pluralism.1 The argument that my paper will be responding to is Ruhmkorff’s 
defense to the incompatibility problem.  He argues that those who assert the truth 
of a single faith are face their own incompatibility problem—the incompatibility 
of denominations within that faith. Ruhmkorff presents a “subsets of belief” 
defense that can be used in response to denominational incompatibility, and then 
cross-applies it to Religious Pluralism to likewise solve for religious 
incompatibility. The argument is meant to show that the religious exclusivist does 
not escape the incompatibility critique unless she holds up one denomination 
within a faith as being exclusively correct (which leads to a problematic kind of 
solipsism) or admits that correct subsets of belief within otherwise incompatible 
belief systems can render both belief systems correct. My thesis is that it is 
unnecessary for the non-pluralist to resort to the belief subset argument, and when 
the pluralist employs the belief subset argument, it still reaches a non-pluralist 
conclusion. I will end the paper by responding to Ruhmkorff’s question-begging 
objection to how ‘confessionalists’ (the title Ruhmkorff uses for non-pluralists) 
define the boundaries of their religions’ beliefs.  
 
DEFINING TERMS  
 
Ruhmkorff defines Religious Pluralism as “the view that more than one religion is 
correct, and that no religion enjoys a special status in relation to the ultimate… 
the correctness of each (religion) is not due to the correctness of any other 
religion.”2 Religious Pluralism does not mandate that every religion is correct, 
just that more than one religion is correct.3 He uses the term confessionalist to 
refer to both forms of religious non-pluralism: exclusivists (those who “hold that 
one religion is correct”) and inclusivists (those who “acknowledge substantial and 
thorough correctness of some sort in religions other than their own,” but “analyze 
this correctness in terms of their own religion”).4 He combines both forms of non-
pluralism because the proponents of each are “committed to an asymmetry among 
religions, with their own having special status.”5 To put it another way, when 
Ruhmkorff uses the term confessionalist, he means to refer to people who hold 
                                                        
1 Samuel Ruhmkorff, “The Incompatibility Problem and Religious Pluralism: Beyond Hick.” 
Philosophy Compass, 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 510-522. 
2 Ibid., 510-11.  
3 Ibid., 511. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 510-11. 
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that, at least in regards to core doctrine, theirs is the only one religious belief 
system that is true (exclusivist). 6  It also refers to people who believe that 
adherents of other religions may ultimately be saved through the true God, despite 
their doctrines being incorrect about this true God (inclusivists).7 An example of 
this would be people who believe that non-Christians can receive salvation, but if 
they do, it is still through Christ (even if they do not intend to be saved through 
Christ).8 Confessionalists are distinguishable from pluralists because pluralists do 
not hold any one religion as uniquely true.9  
 
THE INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEM 
 
Ruhmkorff describes the incompatibility problem in the following way: Religious 
Pluralism asserts that religions X and Y are both true, but religions X and Y have 
incompatible beliefs. Because of the principle of non-contradiction, religions with 
incompatible beliefs cannot both be correct. Therefore, X and Y cannot both be 
correct.10 Ruhmkorff moves from here to say that confessionalists also face an 
incompatibility problem stemming from the incompatible claims of different 
denominations within religions. 
 
The Argument from Denominational Incompatibility 
   
1. Denominations Q and R have incompatible beliefs. 
2. Because of the principle of non-contradiction, Q and R cannot both be 
true. 
3. To assert that just Q or R is true and the other is false brings one 
dangerously close to a kind of religious solipsism, because it is hard to 
imagine even two persons in total alignment in their interpretations of 
doctrinal claims. 
4. Therefore, confessionalists must accept that the incompatible 
denominations are both correct.11  
                                                        
6 Ruhmkorff., 510-511. 
7 Ibid., 511. 
8 Ibid. 
9 However, religious pluralists do not want to say that all religions are equally true, because they 
reject evil or immoral religions. The dividing line seems to be, for pluralists, that no religion, 
among the sufficiently moral religions, is more true than any other. Ibid., 511. This raises a 
difficult issue as to where one is getting their standard of morality for adjudicating the correctness 
of religions. Even if the standard comes from some cross-section convergence of religious 
moralities, why include some religions and exclude others? Gavin D'Costa, “The Impossibility of 
a Pluralist View of Religions,” Religious Studies 32, no. 02 (June 1996): 223, 226.  
10 Ruhmkorff, 511-512. 
11 Ruhmkorff, 512. 
2
Global Tides, Vol. 12 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol12/iss1/5
Ruhmkorff is quick to say that there is more than meets the eye with both of   
  these incompatibility problems. He proposes a confessionalist’s solution to   
  denominational incompatibility, which can be cross-applied to solve a pluralist’s   
  incompatibility problem.12 
 
The Defense of Denominational Incompatibility 
 
1. Denomination Q is committed to belief set φQ and denomination R 
is committed to belief set φR. 
2. Belief sets φQ and φR are incompatible with each other, but there 
are subsets of beliefs within φQ and φR, which, if true, are 
sufficient for the correctness of Q and R (subsets q and r).  
3. The truth of the claims in q is sufficient for the correctness of Q. 
4. The truth of the claims in r is sufficient for the correctness of R. 
5. q and r are compatible. 
6. Therefore “Q and R are incompatible, but in a way that does not 
pose an obstacle to both being correct.”13 
 From here, Ruhmkorff goes on to argue that the same argument works for 
 Religious Pluralism. Religions X and Y have incompatible beliefs, but they could 
 have compatible belief subsets sufficient for saying that the religions are both 
 correct.14  
 Ruhmkorff predicts that confessionalists may argue that no such 
compatible subsets of belief exist between religions capable of demonstrating that 
both religions are correct. 15  He gives the following example, 
“Confessionalists…may argue that if Buddhism is correct, Christianity is 
incorrect on the following grounds. If Buddhism is correct, (i) there is not a 
personal God, and (ii) a fortiori there is not a human who is the incarnation of 
God – and there is no set of claims whose truth is sufficient for the correctness of 
Christianity which does not contain (i) or (ii).”16 Ruhmkorff responds that there 
can be people who profess themselves as Christians while denying that Jesus was 
a personal God incarnate, or they can possess an understanding of divine 
incarnation that is compatible with Buddhism. 17  Ruhmkorff expects that 
confessionalists would “reject such religious self-identification, but adequate, 
non-question-begging reasons must be given for doing so.”18 The confessionalist 
                                                        
12 Ibid., 512-513.  
13 Ibid., 512.  
14 Ibid., 512-513.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 513.  
18 Ruhmkorff, 513. 
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Christian is in a bind where she must demonstrate why her definition of 
Christianity is dispositive. Otherwise, she is unable to prove that Christianity and 
Buddhism do not contain belief subsets that can show both as correct.  
 
Objections to the Argument from Denominational Incompatibility 
 
Objection 1: Recall premise 3 of the incompatibility problem for denominations:  
To assert that just Q or R is true and the other is false brings one 
dangerously close to a kind of religious solipsism, because it is 
hard to imagine even two persons in total alignment in their 
interpretations of doctrinal claims. 
Ruhmkorff does not precisely define what religious solipsism is. He does not tell 
us why it is bad, how ‘close’ we are getting to it or whether that degree of 
‘closeness’ is bad. He only says what “leads” to it, which is “the idea that all 
propositions associated with a denomination need to be true in order for that 
denomination to be correct.”19 What he seems to be referring to is a situation 
where an exclusivist, by asserting only one denomination is correct, is forced via 
a reductio ad absurdum to assert that only their individual understanding of 
religious doctrine is true. This seems like a non-unique problem for religion, 
because anytime someone labels a number of propositions true and a number of 
others false, they come to the conclusion that those who disagree with them on 
those points are incorrect, and this hardly seems to make one a solipsist. 
Ruhmkorff himself is arguing that religious pluralism is true, which means that 
exclusivism and inclusivism are both incorrect by default. Does Ruhmkorff’s own 
argument lead one into dangerous proximity with religious solipsism? If not, then 
neither does the confessionalism. If Ruhmkorff’s argument does bring one 
dangerously close to religious solipsism, then it is self-defeating.  
Furthermore, even if religious solipsism is undesirable, that doesn’t 
necessarily mean that being “dangerously close” to religious solipsism is a terrible 
thing. Whatever the status of being “dangerously close” to religious solipsism is, 
it is not religious solipsism itself. Ruhmkorff needs to supply either independent 
grounds for condemning belief in the correctness of a single denomination, or 
offer an explanation of why asserting the truth of a single denomination above 
others will necessarily result in religious solipsism.20 
Objection 2: Premise 3 of the incompatibility problem for denominations 
states that “it is hard to imagine even two persons in total alignment in their 
                                                        
19 Ibid., 512. 
20 He should also define religious solipsism and why it is problematic. I did not find other authors 
using “religious solipsism” the way that Ruhmkorff does, and applying a strict definition of 
solipsism in its place does not seem to make sense in the context of his paper.  
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interpretations of doctrinal claims.”  Even assuming “religious solipsism” is a 
coherent concept and concrete worry, it is not nearly as difficult as Ruhmkorff 
proposes for two persons to be in total alignment on doctrinal claims. It is 
common for denominations or individual churches to have statements of faith that 
are considered authoritative.21 Now, it is easy for one to bring up examples of 
people arguing over the correct interpretation of certain creeds. However, all it 
takes for two or more persons to be in theological agreement with another is for a 
person to believe whatever their pastor or priest says is true. Or, people could 
meet and discuss divergent interpretations of doctrine before arriving at an 
agreement. This seems far from impossible; I can think of personal examples of 
people with whom I am in theological agreement. So it would seem that merely 
more than one person agreeing to a single religious creed could avoid 
Ruhmkorff’s dangerous road to religious solipsism.  
 Furthermore, one must consider not just complete agreement on doctrine, 
but also agreement on priority within doctrine. For example, if one considers one 
set of beliefs to be incontestable (say a common evangelical formulation of the 
authority of scripture, personal conversion, salvation only through faith in the 
death and resurrection of Jesus, and that Christians need to seek to actively 
evangelize others)22 and hold other beliefs to be contestable (like eschatology, 
dispensationalism, or the nature of ordinances) then even if those people disagree 
on contestable issues, they have a superseding agreement that those issues are 
allowed to be contested. Two persons can agree on what truths are non-negotiable 
while at the same time maintaining that other points of theology are contestable as 
true or false.23 Holding a hierarchy of beliefs allows for the confessionalist to be 
exclusivist to other religions (for example they could say denying the resurrection 
excludes one from fellowship with God) and inclusivist in regards to other 
denominations (for example they could say that faith in the resurrection, though 
held alongside other incorrect beliefs, is sufficient for fellowship with God). So it  
                                                        
21 The Reformed Church of America posts a number of creeds, confessions, and catechisms that 
are authoritative for their member churches. ("Creeds and Confessions," Reformed Church in 
America, https://www.rca.org/rca-basics/creeds-and-confessions.) Nondenominational 
autonomous churches will often have statements of faith to instruct their members. 
22 Richard Kyle, Evangelicalism: an Americanized Christianity (New Brunswick, N.J.: Routledge, 
2006), 11. 
23 Perhaps ‘religious solipsism’ is being argued for as a necessary conclusion on the basis that 
there is a subjective element to belief wherein no two people could be said to believe anything in 
the exact same way, because there is no way to verify that they subjectively experience that belief 
in the same way. This seems to be a discussion beyond the scope of this paper and something that 
would also pose a problem for religious pluralists who still want to say certain beliefs are either 
true or false. Further, statements like there is one God or Jesus rose from the dead seem to be yes 
or no questions rather than particularly subjective ones.  
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seems even more plausible for people to have “total agreement” when they agree 
agreed on incontestable truths and agree to allow disagreement over 
nonessentials.  
 
Objections to the Defense of Denominational Incompatibility 
 
Objection 1: Premises 2-5 of the defense of denominational incompatibility 
propose that denominations have independent subsets of belief that are compatible 
with each other and serve to validate the separate denominations. This, however, 
is not an accurate representation of how unifying subsets operate across 
denominational lines. Rather than premise 4’s characterization that φQ and φR 
possess their own subsets (q and r) that are sufficient for the correctness of the 
denominations, the confessionalist will declare that there is one subset (s) that is 
sufficient for the correctness of the denominations. The subset “s” will contain 
truth claims held in common between φQ and φR that are determined to be 
essential truth claims within the denomination. For example, the Presbyterian may 
say that the Baptist is wrong when it comes to infant baptism, but correct when it 
comes to the core doctrines of the Trinity, scriptural authority, and the gospel 
(Christ’s incarnation, death, burial, resurrection). Both the Presbyterian and the 
Baptist will believe in these core doctrines, and each could agree that those core 
doctrines supersede, in terms of importance, over lesser beliefs.24  
 Referring to a single subset of beliefs shared across denominations also 
better captures how confessionalists validate different denominations. The 
singular subset, as referred to early in the paper, could be truths deemed 
“essential” for the denomination to be correct. Integral in this analysis is not just 
quantifying how many true statements the denomination makes, but also 
qualitatively weighing them. 25  A classic plea for denominational unity in 
                                                        
24 Not every branch of Presbyterianism or every Baptist denomination will agree on all of these 
doctrines, but a number of them will. Confer: the Presbyterian Church of America statement of 
faith (https://www.pcanet.org/beliefs/) and the Southern Baptist Confession statement of faith 
(http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/basicbeliefs.asp).  
25 Who is doing the weighing? The confessionalists, because Ruhmkorff’s argument purports to 
give a confessionalist defense to incompatible denominations and then cross-apply it to pluralists. 
For this to work, then the argument should accurately portray how confessionalists weigh beliefs, 
and confessionalists tend to ascribe to some form of authoritative confession. This side steps the 
issue of question begging because the argument isn’t so much about who gets to define 
“Christianity” in general but about how confessionalists describe their Christianity, and the 
rationality of their particular approach to their Christianity and other faiths/christianities (same 
could be said for confessionalists Muslims, or Jews, and so on). This will come up again at the end 
of the paper under the subheading “A Defense to Ruhmkorff’s Begging the Question Objection.” 
Additionally, both the pluralist and the confessionalist are interested in doing qualitative and not 
just numeric consideration of beliefs, otherwise, given just how many possible differences there 
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Christianity is: “unity in essentials, liberty in non-essentials, and charity in all 
things.”26 “Essentials” comprise the non-negotiable truth claims that supersede the 
less clear and more negotiable non-essentials. This distinction is important in 
terms of religious traditions and how they classify orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and 
heresy.27 It also acknowledges the systematic nature of theology held by many 
religious groups, wherein some beliefs become foundational building blocks of 
the faith and supersede less important beliefs. Christian theologians, in times past, 
have built their systematic theology on the doctrinal cornerstones of the Trinity28 
or the resurrection.29 Foundational beliefs (the core, validating subset) set the 
boundaries for in-group theological debate over the non-essential beliefs.  In the 
qualitative analysis of what makes a denomination mostly true, the foundational 





                                                                                                                                                       
are between denominations based on theological minutia, it could be hard to assert any subset as 
being sufficient for the correctness of a given belief system.  
26 Leroy Garrett, The Stone-Campbell Movement: the Story of the American Restoration 
Movement, Revised ed. (Joplin, MO: College Pr Pub Co, 1994), 33; James T. Bretzke 
SJ, Consecrated Phrases: a Latin Theological Dictionary; Latin Expressions Commonly Found in 
Theological Writings Third Edition, Bilingual ed. (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier, 2013), 105; 
Gleider I. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 200; , The Apostle Paul also struck a balance between making absolute 
truth claims and at other times recognizes humanity’s conceptual limitations, see: 1 Corinthians 
13:8-13, 15:3-20.   
27 Andrew Stephen Damick, Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy: Exploring Belief Systems through the 
Lens Off the Ancient Christian Faith (Chesterton, Ind: Conciliar Press, 2011), 13, 15; Bernard 
Lewis, Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 155; Donald W. Musser 
and Joseph L. Price, New and Enlarged Handbook of Christian Theology (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 2003), 230-231 
28 Peter S. Oh, Karl Barth's Trinitarian Theology: A Study in Karl Barth's Analogical Use of the 
Trinitarian Relation (London: T & T Clark, 2006), ix-xi. 
29 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977). 
30 I do not mean to imply that moral obligations are not integral to confessional faith, but they are 
built upon the foundational beliefs in an orthodox system: Morality is real because God is real; 
“we love [Christ] because he first loved us” (1 Jn 4:19); the authority of scripture is predicated on 
God’s revelation through Christ (see Westminister Confesion of Faith, Chapter 1, “Of the Holy 
Scripture”); http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/; the reality of the resurrection 
authenticates the gospel (see 1 Cor 15:12-15); consider the hierarchy of authority in the teaching 
of the Catholic church (see “On the Papacy and the Teaching Office of the Church," Catholic 
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Revised Defense of Denominational Incompatibility 
 
With these observations in mind, the denominational incompatibility defense can 
be reformulated in the following way: 
1. Denomination Q is committed to belief set φQ and denomination R 
is committed to belief set φR. 
2. Belief sets φQ and φR are incompatible with each other; they 
contain differences. 
3. But there is a subset of beliefs within φQ and φR, which, if true, 
are sufficient for the correctness of Q and R (subset “s”).  
4. the truth of the claims in s is sufficient for the correctness of Q 
5. the truth of the claims in s is sufficient for the correctness of R 
6. Therefore, Q and R are incompatible, but in a way that does not 
pose an obstacle to both being correct. 
Now, a very important step to determining whether or not the religious pluralist 
can adopt this argument formulation is to examine what is meant by “correct” in 
the context of the denominational argument. Ruhmkorff himself acknowledges 
that there is a difference in the way exclusivists and pluralists deem a religion as 
correct.31 “Exclusivists take the correctness of a religion to mean that it makes 
mostly true claims about the transcendent while some pluralists have a sense of 
correctness that allows that a religion can be acknowledged as correct without 
making many or even any claims about the transcendent that are known to be 
true.”32 Pluralists could, for example, reject the principle of non-contradiction, or 
say that there is no God’s eye view of truth, or contest that incompatible religious 
claims can be “noumenally false” but “phenomenally true,” or say that each 
religion is correct if it reaches its “soteriological goal.” 33  But for the 
confessionalist solution of incompatibility to work for pluralists, it must conclude 
with a definition of correctness consistent with how the word functions for 
confessionalists; the pluralist must follow the premises to a conclusion of 
correctness that can function in both a confessionalist and pluralist framework. 
Otherwise, the pluralist is simply running a different argument, and not 
demonstrating a way that the same argument solves for both forms of 
incompatibility. The confessionalist grants the principle of non-contradiction and 
concludes that two different bodies of thought can “make mostly true claims 
about the transcendent” while not completely agreeing with each other. If that is 
how the term “correct” functions in the argument, then the religious pluralist 
using the argument is arguing with that notion of correctness, and likewise 
assuming the principle of non-contradiction.  
                                                        
31 Ruhmkorff, 510-511. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 512-513. 
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This notion of correctness shouldn’t be alien to religious pluralism either 
because, as Gavin D’Costa and others have pointed out, religious pluralists still 
make moral judgments.34 They deem some religions to be more morally true than 
others. The pluralist, for example, would be inclined to say that the Confessing 
Church in Nazi Germany has greater moral validity than the German Christians (a 
group that tried to harmonize Nazism and Christianity).35  
A consequence of the pluralist adopting this denominational compatibility 
argument then, is if they succeed, they succeed as confessionalists, not pluralists. 
They solve for incompatibility by offering a subset of belief, which applies across 
religions, that is dispositive of the faith’s correctness. Here, the pluralist becomes 
a confessionalist by either asserting a form of exclusivism or inclusivism. 
Asserting that an essential belief set is required to validate the truth of a religion 
has the pluralist play the role of an exclusivist. Asserting that a necessary subset 
(typically regarding moral observance) is required for the soteriological goal36 
(some kind of union with the divine) of a religion, has the pluralist acting as an 
inclusivist, because ultimately it is the pluralist’s conception of divinity and 
morality that is true, and a person’s fulfillment of a proper divine-human 
relationship that results in salvation.37 One could object to this characterization 
and say that the pluralist does not assert the truth of their own religion, instead 
asserting a cross-section of truths pulled from various religions. However, the 
pluralist still excludes some religions in its calculus and needs to explain why it 
prefers some religious moralities over others.38 Furthermore, a synthesis of two 
different religious belief sets, so long as it excludes at least one belief from either 
original set, ends up forming a belief set that is different than each prior set.39  
A hypothetical can be helpful to illustrate this point. Let’s say there are 
two religions: the Church of the Peanut Butter & Jelly (PB&J) and the Church of 
the Ham & Swiss (H&S). The Church of PB&J holds to the essential doctrines 
that two pieces of bread, peanut butter, and jelly, are all required for achieving its 
salvific goal (obtaining the best possible lunch). The essential ingredients of a 
PB&J sandwich are non-negotiable, grounding truths. PB&J communities, 
however, use different kinds of bread, peanut butter, and jelly, and may have 
robust debates over which choices are superior. This level of disagreement, 
                                                        
34 D’Costa, 226.  
35 Ibid; Doris L. Bergen, Twisted cross: the German Christian movement in the Third Reich, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, 160, 166.  
36 Ruhmkorff, 513-514; D’Costa, 226.  
37 This notion most closely fits “pragmatic pluralists” as defined by Ruhmkorff. (Ruhmkorff, 512-
513, 518.)  
38 Ruhmkorff, 511; D’Costa 223, 226.  
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however, is allowable in non-core doctrine. Having bread, peanut butter, and jelly 
are all considered equally important, and room is left for variation within those 
categories. The Church of Ham & Swiss holds to the essential ingredients of two 
pieces of bread, ham, and Swiss cheese. The H&S church has virtually the same 
salvific goal as PB&J, and likewise allows for debates over the best kinds of 
bread, ham, and swiss cheese. One day, another party comes along, observes both 
of these religions and has an epiphany. He founds the Church of Any Ol’ 
Sandwich (AOS) and approaches the leaders of the two prior churches and says, 
“guys, you’re both right, salvation is the best lunch possible and the best lunch 
possible is obtained through having a sandwich.”  Upon review, PB&J and H&S 
both reject AOS, because, while trying to synthesize their beliefs, it has rejected 
central doctrine of each. Peanut butter, jelly, ham, and swiss all transfer from 
being foundations to attachments—from essentials to options. It’s hard to see how 
PB&J or H&S can be “mostly true” when their beliefs are not quantitatively 
mostly true, or qualitatively mostly true. AOS has not mutually validated each 
religion; it has only validated the parts of each that fit its own conception of 
religious truth. Its fellow sandwich religions will be saved not because their 
religions are correct about reality, but because AOS is correct.40 
 
A Defense to Ruhmkorff’s Begging the Question Objection 
 
Lastly, I will address Ruhmkorff’s “question-begging” objection to labeling 
beliefs “essential” within a religion.41 It is not the case that a confessionalist must 
affirm the truth of every denomination within its religion. People who self-
identify as Christian, but reject beliefs that the majority of Christian theologies 
would consider foundational, are not particularly relevant to this case. The 
denominational incompatibility arguments is being addressed at confessionalists, 
not Christian pluralists. The incompatibility argument is about the logical 
coherence of taking a particular position on religious truth, and the confessionalist 
need only be precise as to what “Christianities,” “Islams,” or “Judiaisms” she is 
defending. The exclusivist Christian can apply the qualifiers of “confessional” or 
“orthodox” in order to identify the version of Christianity that she is holding to be 
true. Therefore, Ruhmkorff’s question-begging objection appears to be a red-




                                                        
40 The AOS church here is meant to illustrate pluralists and their attempt to use an authoritative 
belief subset to assert two religions are correct. It results in the pluralist becoming more an 
inclusivist than anything else. 
41 Ruhmkorff, 513.  
10




Ruhmkorff’s argument that confessionalists must employ a belief-subsets 
argument to resolve their own incompatibility problem, and that the argument is 
equally accessible to Religious pluralists, is faulty. Confessionalists can assert that 
one denomination is true and others are false, and to do so does not necessarily 
implicate the acceptance of a form of religious solipsism. Ruhmkorff’s 
‘Confessionalist defense to incompatibility’ is ill-structured, because the 
confessionalist asserts a dispositive truth subset, not truth subsets. When the 
pluralist runs through the subset argument, they end up reaching a conclusion akin 
to Confessionalism, not pluralism, because they too assert a correct subset rather 
than separate mutually correct subsets. Lastly, saying that the definitions of 
essential beliefs for a religion is question-begging is not very pertinent to this 
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